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An exploration of metacognition and its effect on mathematical 
performance in differential equations 
 
Mary Jarratt Smith1 
 
Abstract:  Research suggests that students in certain contexts who are 
“metacognitively aware learners” demonstrate better academic performance 
(Shraw & Dennison, 1994; Md. Yunus & Ali, 2008). In this research, the 
metacognitive levels for two classes of differential equations students were 
studied. Students completed a survey adapted from the Metacognitive Awareness 
Inventory (MAI) (Shraw & Dennison, 1994) at the start of the course. The 
questions chosen from the MAI were aimed at three components concerning the 
students’ knowledge about their cognition: declarative knowledge, procedural 
knowledge, and conditional knowledge.  Analysis shows student performance, as 
measured by the course grade, cannot be predicted by metacognitive awareness 
levels.  
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I.  Introduction. 
 
Metacognition is a person’s ability to understand how s/he thinks, reflect upon one’s thinking, 
and control one’s learning based upon the understanding of and reflection on one’s thinking 
(Shraw & Dennison, 1994).  Flavell (1976) considered metacognition remembering to remember, 
and then monitoring and updating knowledge. Cross and Steadman (1996) believe that, though a 
person knows his or her strengths and weaknesses, s/he needs to take the next steps—the 
metacognitive steps—of planning how to approach a problem, checking for understanding, and 
testing for learning. These steps have been described by Nelson and Narens (1990, 1994) as a 
metacognitive system with two basic levels—the meta-level and the object-level.  Information 
flows between the levels to monitor a person’s learning process (object-level to meta-level) and 
control what a person does to enhance their learning (meta-level to object-level). The 
information flow process in the metacognitive system could also be thought of as knowledge 
about cognition (monitor) and regulation of cognition (control) (Shraw & Dennison, 1994).
 In the concept of self-regulated study, as a student studies, s/he monitors his/her learning 
by using a variety of metacognitive judgments (for example, Ease-of-Learning (EOL), 
Judgments of Learning (JOL), Feeling of Knowing (FOK)) (Dunlosky, Serra, & Baker, 2007).  
Then the student decides (or uses controls) to continue to study based on the judgments that were 
made.  In the hierarchical model proposed by Theide and Dunlocky (1999) students regulate 
their learning through planning and goal-setting.  In this model, students set a high or low goal in 
terms of how much they feel they need to master and pre-plan their study time to accomplish 
their goal. In another model, Region of Proximal Learning, by Metcalfe and Kornell (2004) 
students regulate their learning through first choosing what items to study or not study, then stop 
studying an item when they feel that they are no longer learning anything about that item. Other 
researchers have determined that not all students use metacognitive knowledge to control their 
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learning (Son & Metcalfe, 2000) or that the metacognitive knowledge may not be consciously 
used to enhance learning (Reder & Schunn, 1996; Siegler & Shipley, 1995). 
Some research suggests that students who are “metacognitively aware learners” 
demonstrate better academic performance. Schraw and Dennison (1994) generated an inventory 
(Metacognitive Awareness Inventory--MAI) that examined metacognitive awareness and was 
deemed suitable for use with young people and adults.  They tested their instrument on 
undergraduate students in several introductory educational psychology courses at a midwestern 
university. Schraw and Dennison concluded, among other things, that students with high scores 
on the inventory also scored high on reading comprehension exams. Other researchers, 
Md.Yunus and Ali (2008), used the MAI to test mathematics education students in their final 
year at a university in Malaysia.  Their research studied the relationship between metacognition 
and gender and cumulative GPA of the students.  Their findings indicated that procedural, 
declarative, and conditional knowledge (that is, components of the knowledge about cognition 
(Shraw & Dennison, 1994)) have “significant correlation to performance in mathematics and 
overall academic performance” (p. 129) and that “metacognitive scores can predict students’ 
achievement to a certain extent” (p. 130). 
Other research, however, has shown that higher metacognitive awareness did not lead to 
higher scores academically. Pressley and Ghatala (1990) studied students at the university level 
and at the elementary school level with respect to reading comprehension.  Students at both of 
these levels were asked to read something and judge their performance on questions about the 
reading. In a variety of experiments at both elementary and university levels they found that “a 
lot of cognition is not very efficient” (p. 31) and though students may be monitoring their 
studying, poor monitoring contributed to poor performance. Their research suggests that students 
must be both metacognitively aware and proficient at applying this awareness in their studying. 
Studies also indicate that few students engage in the processes of metacognition in a 
manner that would help them be successful at problem solving. Schoenfeld (1992) examined 
how students worked through problems that were not familiar to them and found that many spent 
very little or no time on planning during problem solving. Students would read the problem, 
consider some method of solution and use it without regard to whether it was leading them to a 
solution. Stillman and Galbraith (1998) identified the same lack of planning by students in their 
research. Schoenfeld (1985) also found that students, when they saw that a strategy was not 
working, threw it completely away and did not consider what they learned from that strategy as 
they moved on to another strategy. 
Various other researchers have also noted the importance of planning in problem solving. 
Lester (1982) notes that to be a successful problem solver a person needs to know and 
understand his/her own cognitions and be able to monitor the thought processes throughout the 
solving of the problem.  Silver (1982, 1987) suggests that the strategies used to solve a problem 
are metacognitive and guide how the process proceeds.  In particular a person’s beliefs about 
learning and mathematics can greatly impact how a person solves a mathematical problem. 
Veenmen (2006) believes that initially in the process of solving a mathematics problem, 
metacognitive skills are more important than intellectual ability and that a student needs an 
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II. Inquiry.  
 
For many years the author has observed some students who approach their learning very 
intentionally, systematically using their time and effort. A portion of these students performed 
very well, while other students did not. Conversely, some students who did well appeared to 
have a very haphazard approach to their learning.  These anecdotal observations led the author to 
investigate how her students’ knowledge about their cognition related to their performance, as 
measured by course grades, in a differential equations course. In particular, the author was 
interested in their declarative knowledge (knowing what is important to learn), their procedural 
knowledge (understanding how to use strategies from past experiences), and their conditional 
knowledge (knowing when what strategy is most effective). The author felt that perhaps 
successful students, however they approached their learning, were using metacognitive tools that 
less successful students were not. 
The study is focused on students enrolled in differential equations, a course which requires 
students to have completed two prerequisite semesters of calculus.  The author has taught 
courses in differential equations for 25 years, most of which have involved sections of 
approximately 35 students. In the spring of 2010 and the spring of 2011, trial versions of “large 
sections” (89 students and 120 students, respectively) of differential equations for engineering 
majors were offered. These courses became the focus of this study.  
This study focused on the following research question: 
• Do a student’s metacognitive levels predict his/her course performance, as measured 




The subjects for the study were students in two university junior level differential equations 
courses, from different semesters, with the majority of students majoring in engineering. As 
Nelson and Narens (1990) suggest, the main tool to generate data about a person’s metacognition 
is from their own reports about their thinking.  Hence, students’ metacognitive levels were 
assessed using a survey.  The survey was adapted from the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory 
or MAI, (Shraw & Dennison, 1994) which is considered a reliable measure of knowledge of 
cognition (Sanchez-Alonso & Vovides, 2007).  The survey used a subset of 17 questions that 
were specific to the three areas of knowledge the author intended to study. Each question asked 
students to indicate their perception of the truth of the statement along a continuous scale from 0 
to 100, with zero corresponding to completely false and 100 corresponding to completely true. 
Scores on the survey were translated to a scale of 0 to 10 for the analyses. The survey is attached 
(see Appendix) with notations added to show how the questions related to the areas of 
knowledge being tested (as indicated in the MAI). The survey was administered in the first two 
weeks of the semester and was counted as one homework assignment. 
In the analyses below, only data from students who finished the courses are included (70 
from spring 2010 (Class 1) and 105 from spring 2011 (Class 2)). Students consented to have 
their data included in the study and the methodology was approved by the university’s 
Institutional Review Board. 
To answer the research question, the author compared summative scores on the revised 
MAI instrument using equal interval division to indicate low, moderate, and high metacognition.  
Data were compared using descriptive statistics. Unpaired Student’s t-tests were used to 
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determine any significant differences in means of the data. Cohen’s d was calculated to 
determine effect size for means that were significantly different. Mann-Whitney tests were used 
to determine any statistical significance between the medians of the data.  The two-sample F-test 
was used to determine any differences between variances of the data.   
 
IV. Results.  
 
To get a sense of students’ levels of metacognition when they enter a differential equations 
course, the survey data from the classes were combined and the metacognitive scores were 
considered. 
The summative metacognition scores were broken into three subintervals indicating low, 
moderate, and high metacognition for the three categories of metacognition being examined. 
Table 1 gives the percentage of students, in the classes combined, with scores in each of the 
subintervals.   
 
Table 1. Subintervals of Low, Moderate, and High Summative Metacognition Scores with 
Percentage of Students in each Subinterval (175 students). 
 Low Moderate High 
 
Declarative 40-52 53-66 67-79 
Percentage 13.1 56.5 30.3 
 
Procedural 14-22 23-31 32-40 
Percentage 5.7 49.7 44.6 
 
Conditional 20-29 30-40 41-50 
Percentage 11.4 49.7 38.9 
 
Research Question: Do a student’s metacognitive levels predict his/her course performance, as 
measured by course grade, in a differential equations course?  
This question was studied within classes to account for any differences in the grading of 
the two classes. Students who received an F for the course and completed surveys were not 
considered because of the small number of them (4 in Class 1 and 2 in Class 2). 
 Figures 1 through 3 give the percentage of students, by grade received in the class, in the 
low, moderate, and high subintervals for each category of metacognition studied for both classes. 
(The ranges of scores for the subintervals are as noted in Table 1.) 
For each class individually, the Student’s t-test was used to compare the means of the 
metacognitive scores between students with differing grades.  No significant differences were 
found in Class 1. In Class 2 significant differences were found between students receiving a B in 
the course and those receiving a C in the course in the categories of declarative and conditional 
metacognition.  Class 2 also showed significant differences in means in all metacognitive 
categories when comparing C students to D students.  Tables 2 and 3 give those results. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of students in the low, moderate, and high subintervals for declarative 
metacognition, by grade in class. 
	   	  
Figure 2. Percentage of students in the low, moderate, and high subintervals for procedural 
metacognition, by grade in class. 
	   	  
Figure 3. Percentage of students in the low, moderate, and high subintervals for conditional 














































































Table 2. T-test and Cohen’s D Information for Mean Metacognitive Scores, for B and C 
students, Class 2. 
 Declarative Conditional 
Grade B C B C 
Mean 63.8 58.0 38.6 35.7 
p 0.00155 0.036481 
d 0.74061 0.47439 
Effect Size 0.34726 0.23079 
 
Table 3. T-test and Cohen’s D Information for Mean Metacognitive Scores, for C and D 
students, Class 2 (34 C students and 15 D students). 
 Declarative Procedural Conditional 
Grade C D C D C D 
Mean 58.0 63.4 29.3 32.3 35.7 41.1 
p 0.028988 0.047864 0.007015 
d -0.72913 -0.66258 -0.90727 
Effect Size -0.34251 -0.31448 -0.41311 
    
 Mann-Whitney tests run to compare the medians of the metacognition scores for each 
class between students with differing grades in the course showed no significant differences in 
Class 1.  Class 2 had significant differences in all metacognition categories between C and D 
students.  Table 4 gives those results. 
 Table 4. Mann-Whitney U Test Information for Median Metacognitive Scores, for C and D 
students, Class 2 (34 C students and 15 D students). 
 Declarative Procedural Conditional 
Grade C D C D C D 
Median 56 63 30 33 36 43 
p 0.006934 0.033408 0.033462 
U 352.5 353.0 389.5 
  
Because D students had higher metacognitive levels than C students in Class 2, the 
calculus I and calculus II grades for C and D students were compared to determine whether C 
students came into differential equations with higher content knowledge than D students, thus 
indicating that perhaps prior knowledge had a greater effect on their performance than their 
metacognitive levels.  It was found that there were statistically significant differences in the 
mean scores which C and D students received in these courses.  However, D students had a 
statistically higher mean in calculus I, while C students had a statistically higher mean in 
calculus II.  Table 5 shows the results.  In the calculation of the mean grade for C students in 
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calculus I, three students were not included as they received credit for this course using the 
results of an AP exam or something similar.  The mean grade is based on a 4 point grade scale.  
Table 5. T-test and Cohen’s D Information for Mean Metacognitive Scores, for C and D 
students, Class 2, in Calculus I (31 C students and 15 D students) and Calculus II  (34 C students 
and 15 D students). 
 Calculus I Calculus II 
Grade C D C D 
Mean 2.49 2.95 2.52 2.24 
p 0.0354 0.0309 
d -0.59641 0.56497 
Effect Size -0.28577 0.27184 
 
 Because Class 1 had no significant differences in mean or median metacognitive scores 
between students with differing grades in the course and Class 2 did, the classes were compared 
to see if any insights concerning that would arise. When comparing the classes by grade received 
in the classes and the students’ calculus preparation, no significant differences were found. When 
the classes were compared by grade in the class and their metacognitive scores, the only 
significant difference occurred between C students and their declarative metacognition ,with 





The metacognitive levels for two classes of differential equations students were studied. The 
classes were combined to get a sense of the metacognitive levels of students as they enter 
differential equations.  The classes were considered on their own to determine whether the 
metacognitive scores could predict course performance. 
The metacognition scores for all students in the study were broken into three subintervals 
indicating low, moderate, and high metacognition for the three categories of metacognition being 
examined. Though the majority of students were in the moderate subinterval for all categories, 
over 40% of the students were in the high subinterval for procedural metacognition 
(understanding how to use past strategies) and nearly 40% of the students were in the high 
category for conditional metacognition (knowing which strategy is most effective).   
It would appear that students came into the differential equations classes with very 
reasonable levels of metacognition, in general. 
No significant differences were found in the mean and median metacognitive scores for 
students in Class 1 with differing grades.  However, the statistical analyses show B and C 
students in Class 2 differed significantly in their mean metacognitive scores in knowing what 
was important to learn (declarative knowledge), and in knowing what strategy is most effective 
(conditional knowledge), with B students having higher means.   
 The C and D students from Class 2 also had significantly different mean and median 
metacognitive scores in all categories of metacognition, with D students having the higher means 
and medians. While trying to account for this seeming inconsistency, content knowledge from 
calculus I and calculus II, based on the grade received in each course, was considered and it was 
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found that students receiving a D in the differential equations course had significantly higher 
scores in calculus I and students receiving a C in the differential equations course had 
significantly higher scores in calculus II. 
 When considering Class 1 versus Class 2 the C students were significantly different in the 
declarative metacognition scores.  All other comparisons, by grade received in the course with 
metacognition scores or by grade received in the course with calculus preparation, were not 
significantly different. With the analyses done, no evidence arises that would indicate why the 
classes had the differing metacognitive scores. 
 It is apparent from the findings above that it would be difficult to predict a student’s 
course performance, as measured by the grade in the course, by considering their scores in 
declarative, procedural, and conditional metacognition. While it seems reasonable that B students 
would have higher metacognitive levels than C students (as seen in Class 2), the pattern does not 
hold with other students in Class 2. In fact, the D students (Class 2) had higher metacognitive 
levels than C students. This is not consistent with the results from other studies that used the 
MAI instrument with undergraduates in introductory education psychology (Shraw & Dennison, 
1994) and mathematics (Md. Yunus & Ali, 2008) which indicated that students with higher 
metacognitive awareness have higher academic performances.   
 This analysis indicates that being “metacognitively aware” about one’s cognitive 
knowledge does not necessarily translate into higher academic performance in this academic 
context.   
 
VI. Future Work. 
 
Pressley and Ghatala’s (1990) conclusion that higher metacognitive levels did not necessarily 
lead to higher academic achievement was borne out in this research. Because students who 
received a D in the differential equations course did not necessarily enter the course more 
prepared than the C students, it is obvious that there is much more going on with the students’ 
thinking than was analyzed in this study.  The questions raised from this study have led the 
author to wonder how D students are using the control aspect of metacognition in their learning.  
Are these students setting low goals for themselves, yet are not studying appropriately to master 
material even at that level (Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999)? Are they studying the easier topics and 
not getting to the harder topics (Metcalfe & Kornell, 2004)?  Do these students spend little or no 
time planning their problem solving strategies (Schoenfeld, 1992; Stillman & Galbraith, 1998)?  
When they have solved problems incorrectly do they examine where things went wrong and 
learn from that (Schoenfeld, 1985)? 
 It would be of interest to identify how students in differential equations control their 
study, and perhaps be able to answer questions like those above.  If questions of these types can 
be answered, at least to some degree, it would then be helpful to build into the differential 
equations course ways to introduce productive metacognitive tools that would help the students 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1.  Metacognition Survey Used. 
Instructions:  Please put a mark on the number line that corresponds to how true or false you feel 
the statement is for you in a mathematics course.  Zero implies completely false and 100 implies 
completely true. 
1. I try to use strategies that have worked in the past. (PK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
2. I understand my intellectual strengths and weaknesses. (DK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
3. I know what kind of information is most important to learn. (DK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
4. I am good at organizing information. (DK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
5. I have a specific purpose for each strategy I use. (PK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
6. I learn best when I know something about the topic. (CK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
7. I know what the teacher expects me to learn. (DK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
8. I am good at remembering information. (DK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
9. I use different learning strategies depending on the situation. (CK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
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10. I have control over how well I learn. (DK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
11. I can motivate myself to learn when I need to. (CK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
12. I am aware of what strategies I use when I study. (PK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
13. I use my intellectual strengths to compensate for my weaknesses. (CK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
14. I am a good judge of how well I understand something. (DK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
15. I find myself using helpful learning strategies automatically. (PK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
16. I know when each strategy I use will be most effective. (CK) 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
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